Hole in the Wall:

Informed Short Selling ahead of Private

Placements by Berkman, H. (Henk) et al.
                                   
 
Duisenberg school of finance - Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TI 13-153 /IV/ DSF 62
 
Hole in the Wall:  
Informed Short Selling ahead of Private 
Placements 
 Henk Berkman1 
Michael McKenzie2 
Patrick Verwijmeren3 
 
 
 
 
 
1  University of Auckland; 
2  University of Sydney; 
3  Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Duisenberg School of 
Finance and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands; University of Melbourne; University of 
Glasgow. 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, 
with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in 
core areas of finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Hole in the Wall:  
Informed Short Selling ahead of Private Placements 
Henk Berkman, Michael McKenzie and Patrick Verwijmeren*  
May 10, 2013 
 
Abstract 
Companies planning a private placement typically gauge the interest of potential buyers before 
the offering is publicly announced. Regulators are concerned with this practice, called wall-
crossing, as it might invite insider trading, especially when the potential investors are hedge 
funds. We examine privately placed common stock and convertible offerings and find 
widespread evidence of pre-announcement short selling. We show that pre-announcement short 
sellers are able to predict announcement day returns. The effects are especially strong when 
hedge funds are involved and when the number of buyers is high.  
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The total capital raised via private placements has grown considerably over the last twenty years 
as more companies choose to raise funds through means other than public offerings. For 
example, Chen, Dai and Schatzberg (2010) and Floros and Sapp (2012) provide evidence that the 
Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) market has surpassed the traditional SEO market in 
terms of both dollar volume and number of transactions.
1
 Furthermore, De Jong, Dutordoir and 
Verwijmeren (2011) document that approximately 95 percent of convertible issues in the period 
2003 – 2007 are privately placed. 
When a firm is planning a private placement, it will typically gauge the interest of 
potential investors in a series of confidential conversations before the offering is publicly 
announced.
2
 This practice is commonly referred to as ‘wall-crossing’ and regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD) deems the investor receiving the private information to be a ‘temporary 
insider’. Thus, having crossed the wall, an investor is expressly prohibited under the Securities 
Act from trading on the private information revealed during these conversations. This legal 
restriction of the trading activity of wall-crossers is understandable given that the announcement 
of a private placement often has a material price impact.
3
  
While the academic literature has yet to consider the issue of wall-crossings, it has drawn 
the attention of the regulatory authorities. For example, in a testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, the then chairman of the Securities and 
                                                          
1
 The main difference between PIPEs and traditional private placements is the duration of the resale restrictions on 
the participating investors. The restriction period was typically two years for traditional private placements, whereas 
for PIPEs the shares can typically be publicly traded within 90 days. Traditional private placements have only been 
issued sporadically in the 21
st
 century (Chen, Dai, and Schatzberg, 2010). 
2
 This practice is different from the typical form of book-building, which occurs after the public announcement of 
the intended security issue. 
3
 Variation in the observed announcement effects can be large. Studies examining the announcement effects of 
private placements include Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002), 
who observe positive average announcement effects. De Jong, Dutordoir and Verwijmeren (2011) and Duca, 
Dutordoir, Veld and Verwijmeren (2012) find negative average announcement effects of convertible bonds privately 
placed under Rule 144A. 
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Exchange Commission (SEC), Christopher Cox, stated that the SEC would create a new working 
group to enhance the efforts to combat insider trading by hedge funds, and one of the 
enforcement priorities was short selling based on insider information in private placements 
(Mahoney et al., 2008).
4
 The SEC’s decision to target hedge funds is understandable as hedge 
funds are often the subject of insider trading allegations.
5
 The focus on private placements is also 
unsurprising given that wall-crossings create an obvious opportunity for insider trading and 
hedge funds are heavily involved in PIPE offerings (see Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm, 2009), and 
are the dominant purchasers of convertible securities that are privately placed under Rule 144A 
(see Brown, Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2012).
6
 In recent years, the SEC has filed 
complaints against a variety of hedge fund managers that were allegedly engaging in insider 
trading activity by short selling securities before the public announcement of a private 
placement. We list these complaints in Appendix A. 
In this paper, we investigate the trading behavior of short sellers around PIPE and Rule 
144A private placements. The focus on short sellers is guided by statements of regulatory 
authorities such as the SEC, which clearly highlight short selling as a potential problem in the 
case of private placements. Moreover, using proprietary data from Dataexplorers, we measure 
changes in short interest at a daily frequency and are therefore able to closely monitor the actions 
of these sophisticated investors, predominantly comprising hedge funds. Our sample consists of 
                                                          
4
 Episodes of insider trading have sparked outrage about the perceived abuse of corporate insiders’ privileged 
positions at the expense of ordinary investors (Beny and Seyhun, 2012). The issue of insider trading is important for 
market regulators as it decreases the public’s trust in financial markets, which could lead to reduced stock market 
participation (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). Further, insider trading may increase trading costs (Fishe and 
Robe, 2004) and decrease overall economic growth by raising the cost of capital for firms (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
2002).  
5
 The reputation of hedge funds as potential inside traders was reinforced with the very public arrest of the Galleon 
Group hedge fund founder, Raj Rajaratnam, in 2009. He has since been sentenced to 11 years in prison and fined 
over $150 million. Empirical evidence of insider trading by hedge funds in the syndicated loan market and around 
mergers and acquisitions may be found in Massoud, Nandy, Saunders and Song (2011) and Dai, Massoud, Nandy 
and Saunders (2011), respectively.    
6
 Rule 144A offerings are only issued to Qualified Institutional Buyers, which are typically large institutional buyers 
with more than $100 million of investable assets. 
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private placements of common stock and convertible securities between January 2007 and 
August 2011, which is the period for which we have daily data from Dataexplorers. 
Our results may be summarized as follows. First, we document significant pre-
announcement increases in average short interest, which is evidence of information leakage. 
Second, we find that abnormal pre-announcement increases in short interest are negatively 
related to the stock price reaction to the public announcement of the private placement. This 
result suggests that the information received during the wall-crossing procedure is material, and 
that some privately-informed investors take speculative positions prior to the announcement in 
order to profit from this information. Third, we find that short selling before the announcement is 
more pronounced when there are more buyers involved in the private placement. As the number 
of buyers is likely to correlate closely with the number of investors who have crossed the wall, 
we interpret this result as supporting our hypothesis that the existence of more potential traders 
with private information increases the probability of informed trading in the pre-announcement 
period. Finally, using information on hedge fund involvement in privately-placed security 
offerings, we find that the observed patterns are non-existent when hedge funds are not involved 
and strongest when hedge funds are heavily involved.  
This study contributes to the broader insider trading literature. Prior studies have 
examined situations in which private information has leaked through “Chinese walls” designed 
to separate, for example, commercial and investment banking within the same bank. Ivashina and 
Sun (2011) and Massoud, Nandy, Saunders and Song (2011) find evidence of insider trading by 
institutions that obtain private information by lending in the syndicated loan markets; Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) find that informed banks exploit information in the credit default swap 
market; and Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2009), Dai, Massoud, Nandy, and Saunders (2011), 
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and Beny and Seyhun (2012) find information leakage around merger and acquisition events. On 
the other hand, Griffin, Shu and Topaloglu (2012) do not find evidence that investment bank 
clients use inside information to trade around merger and earnings announcements. We 
contribute to this literature by providing new evidence in the context of private placements, 
which involves an explicit breach of trust between a firm and potential investors. Henry and 
Koski (2010) consider public equity offerings and find no evidence of increased pre-
announcement short selling in public seasoned equity offerings. However, public seasoned 
equity offerings are less likely to be targeted by inside traders, due to the lower involvement of 
hedge funds in that market and the higher scrutiny compared to private security offerings. 
Our study also contributes to the burgeoning literature on short selling. While it has been 
suggested that short sellers are informed traders that are particularly skillful at digesting public 
information (see Engelberg, Reed and Ringgenberg, 2012), we are able to focus on short sellers’ 
use of non-public information. Our findings are consistent with studies that observe increased 
short selling before negative earnings surprises (e.g., Christophe, Ferri, Angel, 2004; Boehmer, 
Jones and Zhang, 2012) and before the appearance of negative firm-specific news in the media 
(Fox, Glosten and Tetlock, 2010). 
Our results have clear regulatory implications and suggest that the limited resources of 
the regulators should be focused on examining placements with a high degree of hedge fund 
involvement and a large number of wall-crossers. Furthermore, our results also suggest that 
regulators may wish to provide more extensive and timely disclosures of short interest.
7
 Apart 
from its impact on the perceived integrity of the stock market, disclosure of short interest would 
be of great interest to the parties directly involved in private placements. For example, in SEC 
                                                          
7
 Section 417 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires a study of “the feasibility, benefits, and costs of requiring reporting 
publicly, in real time short sale positions of publicly listed securities.” The U.K., France and Spain have recently 
adopted rules requiring short sellers to disclose their positions (see Jones, Reed and Waller, 2012).  
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vs. Pollet, a taped conversation lodged as evidence revealed that an underwriter told Pollet that 
his biggest concern was investors who trade before the public announcement.
8
 Finally, our 
results highlight an important downside of wall-crossing. This evidence is timely as U.S. 
President Obama recently signed into law the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) act to 
encourage funding of small businesses, which promotes the use of wall-crossing by young 
companies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes insider trading 
regulation in the context of wall-crossings, while Section II develops the hypotheses. In Section 
III we describe our data, and in Sections IV and V we present and discuss our results. We 
provide additional tests in Section VI and conclude in Section VII. 
 
I. Wall-Crossings and Insider trading Regulation  
Reg FD requires that companies must disclose material information to all investors at the 
same time. Exemptions to this rule do exist however, as communications without public 
disclosure can be made to those who owe the issuer a duty of trust or confidence, such as an 
attorney or an accountant. These exclusions also apply to communications made to any person 
for legitimate business purposes, subject to the proviso that they expressly agree to maintain the 
information in confidence. This class of exclusions is relevant when a firm is considering raising 
capital through a private placement as it allows issuers and underwriters to confidentially gauge 
interest in an offering prior to any public disclosure.  
Generally, private placements are initially marketed on an anonymous basis by an 
underwriter to a limited number of institutional investors. This is sometimes called a pre-
                                                          
8
 Pollet replied: “but it’s illegal” and then allegedly short sold the stock before the public announcement anyway 
(www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19984.htm). 
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sounding, sounding-out or pre-marketing campaign. If an investor is interested, they sign a 
confidentiality agreement and are informed of the identity of the issuer and the specifics of the 
offering. It is at this point that the investor legally crosses the wall and becomes a temporary 
insider. As such, they are restricted from trading in the issuer’s securities until a public 
announcement of the offering has been made or else face the risk of prosecution for insider 
trading. 
 In 2004, potential irregularities in wall-crossing attracted the attention of the U.S 
regulator. The SEC sent out requests for documents to securities brokers and other firms that sell 
securities to hedge funds in private transactions. The agency was concerned that these firms may 
have leaked news of forthcoming deals to favored clients, allowing them to profit by trading the 
stock ahead of the announcement (Pulliam, 2004). Subsequently, the SEC made the decision to 
focus on the trading activity of hedge funds and one of the enforcement priorities was short 
selling based on insider information in private placements (Mahoney et al., 2008).  
Since 2005, the SEC has filed complaints against a variety of hedge fund managers. The 
SEC accused them of engaging in illegal insider trading by short selling issuer securities on the 
basis of material, non-public information prior to the announcement of a private offering, 
notwithstanding their agreement to keep information about the offering confidential and to 
refrain from trading prior to the public announcement. Appendix A provides a brief description 
of these cases, all of which relate to PIPE issues. Most of the defendants consented to final 
judgments, without admitting or denying the accusations, leading to civil fines and repayment of 
unlawful profits. The amounts can be high and exceeded U.S.$15 million in the case of SEC 
versus Langley Partners. In the cases where the judges did make rulings, a not guilty verdict was 
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returned in some cases because the judge ruled that the announcement effect of the PIPE was too 
small for information to be deemed “material” (see Hartlin, 2009).  
The issue of insider trading by wall-crossed investors has also attracted the attention of 
regulators outside the United States. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) accused a hedge fund manager of short selling after being wall-crossed in 2003, and fined 
him in 2006.
9
 In the course of the first half of 2012, the FSA released details of five market 
abuse enforcement cases involving improper disclosure and insider dealing on the basis of 
information released during a pre-sounding exercise.
10
 In France, the market regulator fined four 
hedge funds after an insider trading investigation into a Vivendi Universal SA securities sale in 
2002. The hedge funds were accused of using information resulting from being wall-crossed and 
massively selling shares ahead of the official announcement of the operation (Vivendi shares fell 
14 percent in the three days before the offering).
11
 Japan’s Financial Services Agency also 
started several investigations into allegations of insider trading ahead of public share offerings.  
For example, in the case against Whitney Japan Fund, one of Japan’s highest profile hedge 
funds, the Japanese regulator has ordered a dozen investment banks to report on whether they 
had leaked inside information about planned share issues to this hedge fund in return for winning 
trading orders.
12
  
 
 II. Hypothesis Development  
In the spirit of Ritter (2008), who coined the term “forensic finance,” we consider a large 
sample of private placements to empirically establish whether the problem of insider trading is 
                                                          
9
 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2006/077.shtml 
10
 See the cases of Einhorn, Hannam, Kyprios, Osborne and Ten-Holter on 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/what/financial_crime/market_abuse/library/notices/index.shtml 
11
 See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aCPasXEGQ8sw&refer=germany 
12
 See http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/7/21/business/11704988&sec=business 
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limited to a few rogues, as implied by the small number of legal cases, or is more widespread. 
The focus of this paper is on the trading behavior of short sellers in the period before a private 
placement. This approach is consistent with the legal cases discussed in the previous section. 
Moreover, using daily changes in short interest from Dataexplorers, we have detailed insight into 
the actions of these sophisticated investors.  
We argue that information leakage about the upcoming private placement should result in 
an increase in short interest prior to the announcement of a private placement. This statement 
assumes that at least some of those who are privy to the pre-announcement information are 
willing to trade on it. These short sellers might trade for speculative reasons in an attempt to 
exploit a negative announcement effect.
13
 These short sellers might also be wall-crossed 
investors who decide to lock-in a profit on the securities they agreed to purchase, as the 
securities in a private placement are typically offered at a discount. Importantly, both 
speculation-induced pre-announcement short selling and hedging-induced pre-announcement 
short selling is considered illegal by the SEC. 
 
H1. Firms that privately place securities experience an increase in short interest prior to the 
public announcement of the offering. 
 
If short sellers are informed speculators, then private placements with negative 
announcement returns that are larger in magnitude should, on average, experience a larger 
increase in short interest before the announcement. On the other hand, if short sellers are 
uninformed or trade for the purposes of hedging, then the pre-announcement change in short 
                                                          
13
 Note that even though the pre-announcement information might induce some traders to assume long positions and 
others to assume short positions, we only observe the actions of short sellers. 
10 
 
interest should be unrelated to abnormal announcement returns. This leads to the second 
hypothesis.  
 
H2. The change in short interest in the pre-announcement period is negatively related to the 
abnormal return at the time of the public announcement of the private placement. 
 
The third test is designed to provide further insights into these previous results and 
examines whether short selling before the announcement is related to the number of buyers. 
Acharya and Johnson (2010) find that a larger number of financing participants increases the 
likelihood of observing suspicious patterns prior to bid announcements of private-equity buyouts. 
Based on their results, and assuming that the number of buyers (which we do observe) is 
positively related to the number of temporary insiders (which we do not observe), we argue that 
a larger number of buyers increases the probability that at least some temporary insiders will be 
willing to risk possible prosecution and damaging their relationship with the issuing firm or 
underwriter by short selling before the public announcement.  
 
H3. Pre-announcement short selling is more pronounced and the negative relation between 
changes in short interest in the pre-announcement period and announcement day returns is 
stronger when there are more buyers involved in the private placement. 
 
The final hypothesis focuses specifically on the role of hedge funds. As noted by 
Massoud, Nandy, Saunders and Song (2011), hedge funds are largely unregulated with respect to 
their long and short equity holdings in comparison with other institutional investors, and have 
11 
 
fewer internal information barriers (Chinese walls) between those involved in financing 
decisions and those involved in trading decisions. Hedge funds also have an incentive-based fee 
structure that makes informational advantages extremely valuable. These factors, combined with 
the fact that short selling is part of the day-to-day activities of hedge funds, leads us to expect 
that the involvement of hedge funds exacerbates the observed patterns in pre-announcement 
short selling and that the degree of informed short selling is a function of the number of hedge 
funds involved. 
 
H4. Pre-announcement short selling, the impact of the number of buyers, and the relation 
between pre-announcement changes in short interest and announcement returns are all more 
pronounced when the buyers are hedge funds. 
 
III. Sample Selection, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Sample selection 
We obtain a sample of private placements from Securities Data Company (SDC) and 
Sagient’s PlacementTracker.14 We obtain all placements for the period January 2007 to August 
2011, which is the period for which we have daily data on short interest from Dataexplorers. The 
private placements include PIPE offerings, which can be structured as common stock or 
convertible securities.
15
 The private placements also include convertible offerings placed under 
                                                          
14
 These databases only partially overlap. Most notably, the Sagient database includes more PIPE issues, and is 
typically used in studies on PIPEs. The Sagient database also reports information on hedge fund involvement in the 
offerings.  
15
 The PIPE issues in our sample are traditional PIPEs rather than structured PIPEs, which have virtually 
disappeared since 2003 because of legal issues associated with potential market manipulation. Structured PIPEs are 
not price protected, and conversion prices of structured PIPEs can be adjusted downward if there are for example 
adverse changes in market conditions (see Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004).  
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Rule 144A, which allows companies to sell securities without registration under the U.S. 
Security Act of 1933 if the securities are issued only to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs).
16
 
The sample is restricted to issuers whose ordinary common shares trade on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges and have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 (i.e. we exclude REITS, 
Closed-End Funds, ADRs, Canadian Firms and Other Non-U.S. Incorporated Firms, Primes and 
Scores, and HOLDRs). IPOs, right offerings, exchangeable securities, secondary offerings by 
current blockholders, and shelf filings that only state the issuer “may sell shares periodically” 
(see Henry and Koski, 2010) are also excluded. The data are further filtered to include only 
stocks that have information in CRSP, Compustat and Dataexplorers at the time of the issue. It is 
also a requirement that, two weeks before the announcement, there is a non-zero number of 
shares available for lending and that the stock price is larger than one dollar.  
Announcement dates are obtained from Factiva and we use the timestamp from the 
earliest newswire to assign an announcement date. If the announcement occurs after the close of 
trading, the following trading day is identified as the announcement date (day 0). When no 
announcement is available in Factiva or when the announcement coincides with another major 
announcement (like a merger agreement), that observation is deleted from the dataset. After 
applying all these criteria, we are left with a sample of 323 convertible bond issues and 339 
common stock issues by 536 unique firms. 
 
B. Short interest data 
Daily short interest data are sourced from Dataexplorers, an independent data vendor 
whose clients include trading desks, hedge funds and industry participants. The Dataexplorers 
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 QIBs, which are typically large institutional buyers with more than $100 million of investable assets, are allowed 
to trade the offering among themselves. 
13 
 
database is accessible through Bloomberg and provides daily aggregated inventory information 
for over 22,000 funds who lend through over 100 wholesale stock lending market participants 
across 33 countries.
17
 Dataexplorers provides daily security-level information on the quantity of 
shares available for lending (referred to as the level of beneficial ownership), which is measured 
as the total number of shares held by all beneficial owners
18
 divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. Volume information for loan transactions is also available, which provides 
information on the level of short interest and is measured as the total number of shares lent, 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. The daily average loan fee for new loans is also 
included, which provides information on the transactions cost to stock lenders.  
 There are a number of differences between publicly available short interest data from 
sources such as the NYSE and NASDAQ and the short interest data from Dataexplorers. Most 
notably, short interest in Dataexplorers is available on a daily basis, whereas short interest data 
from the NYSE and NASDAQ is available on a (semi-)monthly basis. Despite the obvious and 
unique value of the Dataexplorers data set, there are limitations. Firstly, not all custodians report 
to Dataexplorers. By their own estimates, the Dataexplorers database covers approximately 70 
percent of trading in the stock lending market. Secondly, the Dataexplorers database captures 
lending for purposes other than short selling. Similarly though, the publicly available short data 
also do not solely reflect lending.
19
 Despite these differences, Dataexplorers document that the 
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 Further details of the Dataexplorers database can be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), Berkman and 
McKenzie (2012) and www.dataexplorers.co.uk. 
18
 Beneficial owners are the wholesale lenders of stock such as pension funds or mutual funds. Inventory and loan 
information is normally reported to Dataexplorers by the custodians, who are the beneficial owners’ agents in the 
lending process. 
19
 The publicly available short data capture lending for short selling as well as lending for rehypothecation (where a 
prime broker borrows a fund’s long position to cover another fund’s short position) and exclusive trading (asset 
managers agree to lend a portfolio exclusively to a single counterparty). While the lending captured in the 
Dataexplorers database is for short selling, stocks are also loaned for reasons related to dividend arbitrage (typically 
to extract tax benefits through deals with foreign parties) and settlement (where a fund is unable to buy or sell a 
stock immediately, it must borrow the security). The data also include ‘pay-to-hold’ transactions, whereby a 
14 
 
correlation between the publicly reported level of short interest in the U.S. market and the 
Dataexplorers data is almost 0.90. Our own validation of the database confirms this to be 
accurate.  
Finally, note that alternative sources of daily short sales data are available, but these 
databases only cover small periods and, more importantly, these databases capture only sales by 
short sellers. For example, the Reg-SHO data and short sales data collected by the NASDAQ and 
NYSE only include additions to short interest, but not the reductions as brokers have to disclose 
whether a sell order is a short sale, but not whether a buy order is intended to cover a short. 
 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our total sample of 662 private 
placements, and Appendix B provides the definitions of our variables. The firms in our sample 
on average have total assets of $8,279 million. The average issue raised $166 million in proceeds 
or 22 percent of the firm’s pre-issue market capitalization. The Dataexplorers data show that on 
the announcement date, day 0, the average short interest in firms privately placing capital is 6.20 
percent, with a standard deviation of 7.39 percent. The average beneficial ownership on the 
announcement date is 13.25 percent, with a standard deviation of 12.49 percent. Thus, these data 
suggest there is a wide dispersion of short interest and institutional ownership among the private 
placements in the sample.  
For a restricted sample of 451 private placements, we have additional information on the 
total number of buyers and the total number of hedge funds among these buyers. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
speculator will pay to hold borrowed stock as a form of option against the possibility of an announcement. Our 
discussions with industry participants suggest that pay to hold is more common in companies with limited lending 
availability (due to limited free floats or company size) given the likely scramble for shares if an announcement 
eventuates. This type of strategy became much less popular in the post-GFC era. 
15 
 
information is obtained from either the Sagient database, or, if missing, from the registration 
statements available from SEC Edgar.
20
 The total number of buyers in our sample ranges from 1 
to 467, with a mean of 14. Fifty-one percent of the private placements involve buyers who are 
hedge funds and the average number of hedge fund buyers is 7.  
 
[ insert Table 1 here ] 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents a summary of the data distinguishing between Rule 144A and 
PIPE convertible debt issues as well as the sample of PIPE common stock issues.
21
 On average, a 
firm privately issuing common stock tends to be smaller, has higher market-to-book ratios, 
higher annualized volatility, lower return on assets, lower leverage, and is less likely to pay 
dividends compared to firms issuing convertible debt. Both short interest and beneficial 
ownership are lower for firms privately placing common stock than for firms with private 
placements of convertibles. 
Rule 144A convertible debt offerings tend to have a substantially larger level of 
institutional ownership (26.37 percent compared to around 10 percent for PIPE issues). They 
also tend to have almost twice the average level of short interest (9.17 percent compared to 
around 5 percent for PIPE issues) and a much lower average lending fee (100bps compared to 
385bps for PIPE convertible debt and 539bps for common stock offerings).  
The average number of buyers for private placements of common stock is 9, and this 
average is 38 for 144A convertible offerings and 14 for convertible PIPEs. Consistent with Choi, 
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 The registration statements in SEC Edgar (either S-3/A, S-3, S-3ASR, or 424B filings) contain a list of buyers in 
their “Selling Securityholders” section. Obtaining the identity of buyers from registration statements follows the 
procedure in Brown, Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2012).  
21
 As noted by Chen, Dai and Schatzberg (2010), there have been few non-PIPE private placements of common 
stock in the 21
st
 century. 
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Getmansky and Tookes (2009) and Brown, Grundy, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2012), hedge 
funds are frequently involved in convertible issues under Rule 144A. Hedge funds are involved 
in 73 percent of 144A issues and there are on average 21 hedge fund buyers, which is noticeably 
higher than in PIPE issues. 
The last three rows of Panel B in Table 1 contain information specific to the 144A and 
PIPE convertible issues. The average time to maturity is longer for 144A convertibles, whereas 
the conversion premium and the mean delta are very similar for both types of convertibles.  
 
D. Announcement Day Returns 
As a first step in the analysis, we calculate the benchmark-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns on the announcement day and the following day (i.e., day 0 and day 1). For each stock, 
the abnormal return on day t is the actual return on day t, minus the return on the matching size 
and book-to-market portfolio on day t.
22
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the cumulative 
abnormal return for the whole sample as well as for the three different types of private 
placements. The mean announcement return for the entire sample is 1.06 percent (t-statistic is 
2.2), and the median announcement return is -0.06 percent.  
The average cumulative abnormal return equals -3.51 percent (t-statistic is -5.4) for 144A 
convertibles, 2.48 percent (t-statistic is 2.0) for convertible PIPE issues and 2.40 percent (t-
statistic is 3.7) for common stock PIPEs. The standard deviations for these three groups are 8.08 
percent, 16.10 percent, and 11.84 percent, respectively. These relatively high standard deviations 
highlight the diversity of market responses to private placement announcements. 
                                                          
22
 The benchmark return is the value-weighted return for the intersections of 5 size and 5 book-to-market portfolios 
from Ken French’s website. The size breakpoints for year t are the NYSE market equity quintiles at the end of June 
of t. The book-to-market breakpoints are NYSE quintiles, where the book-to-market ratio for June of year t is the 
book equity for the fiscal year end in t-1 divided by the market value of equity for December of t-1. 
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IV. Patterns in Short Interest, Lendable shares and the Lending Fee 
The first hypothesis relates to whether firms with private placements experience an 
increase in short interest prior to a public announcement of the offering. Figure 1A and Figure 
1B present plots of the pattern in mean short interest over the window -50 to +40 days around the 
announcement for convertible bond private placements and common stock private placements, 
respectively. Interestingly, both plots display a strong run-up in short interest prior to the 
announcement. Also of interest is that the speed with which this happens markedly differs. For 
convertible issues, most of the increase in short interest occurs in the few days prior to the 
announcement of the offering. For common stock issues, however, this increase begins about a 
month prior to the announcement and continues until a few days before the public 
announcement.
23
 These differences in the pattern of build-up of short positions are in line with 
the high involvement of convertible arbitrage hedge funds in convertible issues. Convertible 
arbitrage hedge funds combine their purchase of convertible bonds with short positions in the 
underlying stock to hedge against changes of the stock price (see for example Mitchell, Pedersen 
and Pulvino, 2007; Choi, Getmansky and Tookes, 2009; Brown, Grundy, Lewis and 
Verwijmeren, 2012), and because of their hedged positions they are able to make their 
investment decisions very quickly (see Dong, Dutordoir and Veld, 2013).
24
  
                                                          
23
 Relatively long wall-crossing periods are not uncommon for common stock PIPEs. For example, the SEC versus 
Gryphon Partners outlines a 2003 Celsion Corporation PIPE offering, in which the executive summary of the 
offering was e-mailed on May 21
st
, the confidentiality agreement was received on June 3
rd
, and the public 
announcement occurred on July 8
th
.  
24
 Dong, Dutordoir and Veld (2013) interview financial managers of companies that issued convertible securities 
and are told that convertible arbitrage hedge funds are typically able to make their investment decisions within a 
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[ insert Figure 1 here ] 
 
Following the announcement of the private placement, the level of short interest stays at 
an elevated level for convertible issues, which reflects the activity of convertible arbitrageurs. By 
way of contrast, short interest in common stock issues peaks a few days prior to the 
announcement and falls thereafter. This observed pattern suggests that the increase in short 
interest prior to the announcement is mainly the result of speculative positions taken by short 
sellers rather than pre-announcement (and therefore also illegal) hedging activity.
25
 In case of 
hedging the common stock PIPE issue, short interest would remain at this elevated level for 
about 90 days (see footnote 1) until the investor acquired the shares from the issuer, at which 
time they could close their short positions and short interest would fall considerably.
26
  
To provide further insights, we tabulate average abnormal short interest, lendable shares 
(beneficial ownership), turnover and the value weighted average lending fee over the period -20 
to +10 trading days, which is the period when the largest changes are observed. To calculate the 
abnormal values, we first define the ‘normal’ value of these variables as the event-specific 
average over the 30-day period from day -50 to -21. Then, for each event day in the period -20 to 
+10, we subtract this average from the actual value. Next, we average the daily abnormal values 
across all observations in each group. For each group, the t-statistics are based on the standard 
deviation across these daily abnormal values.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
day. Convertible arbitrage hedge funds do not need to talk to management or form credit committees, according to 
one of the interviewed managers. 
25
 Recall that legal hedging activity would manifest itself as a rapid increase in short positions at the time of the 
announcement as any trading prior to that would be deemed insider trading.  
26
 The SEC requires that the closing out of post-announcement short sale transactions is done with shares acquired 
on the open market (referred to as the ‘double print’ technique).  In the event that the short sale transaction is closed 
out using shares acquired under the PIPE (a ‘wash’ trade), the SEC has argued that the seller is delivering 
unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act (for a detailed discussion see Hartlin, 2009). 
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The first columns of Table 3 present the results for the 323 private placements of 
convertible bonds. Consistent with the raw data presented in Figure 1, we observe a sharp 
increase in abnormal short interest in the last three days before the announcement and this 
increase is statistically significant. Short interest increases further after the announcement, 
consistent with convertible arbitrageurs increasing their short positions. The abnormal lending 
fee is significantly positive on several days before the announcement and on most days after the 
announcement. Finally, abnormal turnover is significantly positive from day -1 to day +6, while 
there is no readily observable pattern in the number of lendable shares close to the 
announcement.  
 
[ insert Table 3 here ] 
 
The columns on the right of Table 3 present the descriptive metrics for the 339 common 
stock offerings. There is a significant increase in abnormal short interest in the 20 days before 
the announcement for common stock offerings. Short interest peaks on day -3 at a level of 0.61 
percent of shares outstanding above the normal level (the t-statistic is 4.1) and then decreases in 
the next 2 weeks to a level of 0.15 percent of shares outstanding above the normal level of short 
interest. There is no evidence of any abnormal patterns in beneficial ownership, whereas the 
lending fee and turnover are significantly elevated in the days immediately after the 
announcement.  
 
V. Announcement Returns, Number of Buyers, and Hedge Funds 
A. Does the change in short interest predict announcement returns? 
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The results in the previous section provide strong support for the first hypothesis: firms 
that have private placements on average experience a significant increase in short interest prior to 
the public announcement of the offering. This increase in short interest in the days before the 
private placement announcement could suggest that informed speculators are positioning 
themselves to benefit from expected changes in the stock price following the announcement of 
the offering. On the other hand, the pre-announcement short selling could be due to wall-crossed 
investors illegally hedging the securities they agreed to purchase before the announcement of the 
security, without these investors expecting any particular abnormal return on the announcement 
date. Our second hypothesis can provide insights into the importance of the speculation-based 
rationale as the hypothesis relates to whether short sellers are successful in exploiting their 
informational advantage about the upcoming announcement, in which case the pre-
announcement change in short interest is expected to be negatively related to the announcement 
return. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following regression model:
27
 
 
ΔSI(-T,-1)i =  + 1 CAR(0,+1)i +  CAR(-T,-1)i +  ATurn(-T,-1)i +  Fee(-T,-1)i +              
Rel_Proceedsi + εi           (1) 
 
where: 
ΔSI(-T,-1) = the change in short interest for stock i over day -T to day -1 where T = 10 or 
20. We present results for a 10- and a 20-day window in order to align the 
measurement period with the long period over which the increase in abnormal short 
interest is observed (see Figure 1 and Table 3);  
                                                          
27
 Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2005) use a comparable model to test whether short sellers have the ability to 
predict abnormal returns in reaction to earnings announcements. 
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CAR(0,+1) = cumulative abnormal return for stock i over day 0 and day 1, i.e. the 
abnormal announcement return measured over the period from the close on day -1 to 
the close on day +1; 
CAR(-T,-1) = cumulative abnormal return on stock i over the interval from day -T to day 
-1. This variable is included to control for the possibility that changes in the stock 
price affect the change of short interest in the days leading up to the announcement; 
ATurn(-T,-1) = average daily abnormal turnover in stock i over the interval from day -T 
to day -1, where daily abnormal turnover is defined as the difference between actual 
turnover and average turnover over the period from day -50 to -21. This variable is 
included to account for the potential contemporaneous correlation between changes in 
short interest and changes in turnover; 
Fee(-T,-1) = average daily lending fee in stock i over the interval from day -T to day -1. 
We expect that stocks that are more expensive to short have a smaller increase in short 
interest; and 
Rel_Proceeds = the proceeds of the issue as a percentage of market capitalization. This 
variable is included as a control for the size of the issue.  
 
For convertible issues, the estimated model is an extended version of equation (1), in 
which we also include a dummy variable that indicates whether the convertible issue is a Rule 
144A offering (D144A), and an interactive term that captures the cross effects between a Rule 
144A offering and the announcement return (D144A*CAR(0,+1)). In order to reduce the influence 
of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. All 
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reported p-values for the coefficients in the panel regressions are based on standard errors that 
are clustered by firm and quarter.  
 
[ insert Table 4 here ] 
  
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results for convertible issues, where the change in short 
interest is measured over a 10- and 20-day window. The main coefficient of interest is 1 in 
equation (1), which measures the strength of the relation between the change in short interest in 
the pre-announcement period and the abnormal announcement period return, CAR(0,+1). The 
results show that, consistent with our hypothesis, the change in short interest in the pre-
announcement period is negatively and significantly associated with the announcement period 
return.  
Of the other variables included in the equations, we find that the abnormal turnover and 
fee have significant effects. Consistent with expectations, higher turnover is positively related to 
the change in short interest and a higher fee is associated with a smaller increase in short interest. 
In Panel B of Table 4, we consider the relation between short interest and announcement 
returns for common stock. The results show that the change in short interest is significantly and 
negatively related to the announcement returns for both the 10-day and 20-day windows. 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, we find that larger issues have greater changes in 
short interest in the pre-announcement period, and there is a significant negative relation between 
short interest and the fee, again suggesting that stocks with higher fees experience smaller 
increases in short interest.  
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To summarize, the evidence in Table 4 provides support for the hypothesis that informed 
short sellers successfully change their positions in anticipation of the market reaction to the 
announcement of private placements of convertible bonds and common stock. We provide 
additional tests related to our second hypothesis in Section VI.C, where we predict 
announcement returns based on information available to wall-crossed investors before the 
announcement, including the offering discount. 
 
B. The number of buyers in a private placement 
For 451 of our 662 issues, we have information on the number of buyers involved in the 
private placement. The actual number of wall-crossed investors is likely to exceed the number of 
buyers as wall-crossed investors are free to decline the invitation to invest in the security offering 
even after they agree to be wall-crossed. However, while no information on the actual number of 
investors that have crossed the wall is available, it is reasonable to expect that this number would 
be positively correlated with the number of actual buyers.  
Our third hypothesis is that pre-announcement short selling is more pronounced and the 
negative relation between pre-announcement short selling and announcement day returns is 
stronger when there are more buyers involved in the private placement. To test this hypothesis, 
the reduced sample is split into three groups based on the number of buyers: the first group 
consists of private placements with one buyer (n=150); the second group consists of private 
placements with 2 to 10 buyers (n=134); and the third group consists of private placements with 
more than 10 buyers (n=167). 
Figures 2 and 3 present plots of average short interest in the period -50, +40 for these 
three groups. Figure 2 represents convertible private placements and Figure 3 represents 
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common stock private placements. It is interesting to note that the previously documented 
patterns of changes in short interest for both convertible bond and common stock placements are 
most apparent in the sample of issues that have more than 10 buyers. For convertible placements 
with 2 to 10 buyers the overall trend is still apparent, but some of the detail is lost and the 
magnitudes of change are far less than if there are more than 10 buyers. The plots for common 
stock placements with more than 10 buyers and 2 to 10 buyers are more similar, but again, the 
build-up in short positions in the pre-announcement period is more pronounced when there are 
more than 10 buyers.  
Where there is only one buyer, the identified patterns are largely lost. Convertible issues 
with a single buyer exhibit no appreciable change in short interest until the time of the 
announcement, after which it falls by an average of around 1.5 percent. Short interest in common 
stock issues with a single buyer falls throughout the entire window and the magnitude of the 
decrease after the announcement is relatively small at about 0.4 percent. These obvious 
differences in the behavior of short sellers could reflect the lower probability to stay off the 
SEC’s radar if only a small number of firms have crossed the wall.  In addition, the share price 
reaction for the group of firms with only one buyer is relatively favorable with an average 
CAR(0,+1) of 4.5 percent (t-statistic is 4.1), whereas for the group of events with 2 to 10 buyers 
the average CAR(0,+1) is 0.01 percent (t-statistic is 0.7), and for private placements with more 
than 10 buyers the average CAR(0,+1) is 0.00 percent (t-statistic is 0.3).  
 
[ insert Figures 2 and 3 here ] 
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To formally test whether the number of buyers affects i) the change in short interest in the 
pre-announcement period and ii) the relation between the change in short interest and the 
announcement return, we estimate the following model:
28
 
 
ΔSI(-T,-1)i =  + DB,2-10 +  DB,>10 +  CAR(0,+1)i +  DB,2-10*CAR(0,+1)i +  
DB,>10*CAR(0,+1)i +  CAR(-T,-1)i +   ATurni(-T,-1)i  +   Fee(-T,-1)i +  
Rel_Proceedsi + εi                (2) 
 
where DB,2-10 (DB,>10) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the number of buyers in 
the private placement is between 2 and 10 (greater than 10) and is zero otherwise. The other 
variables are as previously defined and the estimation results are presented in Table 5. For both 
windows considered, we find that the increase in short interest in the pre-announcement period is 
significantly higher for private placements with more than 10 buyers compared to private 
placements with only one buyer (i.e., is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for both 
windows). For private placements with 2 to 10 buyers, short interest also increases more than for 
private placements with one buyer, and this difference is significant at the 10 percent level for 
the 20-day window.  
Moreover, for both windows, we find that the relation between the announcement return 
and the pre-announcement change in short interest is stronger (i.e. more negative) if there is 
more than one buyer. The difference in the coefficients for the cumulative abnormal 
announcement return is significant at the 10 percent level or better for private placements with 
                                                          
28
 Because we require information on the number of buyers, our sample size is smaller than in the previous section. 
To increase the power of our test, we combine the sample of common stock and convertible issues. We have 
confirmed that inclusion of a dummy variable to distinguish common stock and convertible bond placements does 
not change the conclusions of our analysis. 
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more than 10 buyers. The difference is not statistically significant for placements with 2 to 10 
buyers. All other coefficients are as previously discussed.  
In summary, the results of Table 5 provide support for the hypothesis that informed 
trading before the announcement is more prevalent if there are more buyers involved in the 
private placements. The results also provide support for the hypothesis that pre-announcement 
short selling is more informative about announcement day returns when there are many buyers 
involved in the private placement. 
 
[ insert Table 5 here ] 
 
C. Hedge funds 
The final hypothesis concerns a formal test of the role of hedge funds. Hedge funds are 
thought to have greater opportunities to engage in insider trading as they are largely unregulated, 
have few reporting requirements, can hold both long and short equity positions, have fewer 
internal information barriers, such as Chinese walls, and have an incentive based fee structure 
that makes any informational advantage extremely valuable. Within private placements, Dai 
(2007) shows that hedge funds differ from other investors by keeping their stakes for shorter 
periods of time and by being less likely to obtain board seats. 
To test the impact of hedge fund involvement in private placements, we modify equation 
(2) to include both the number of hedge funds and the number of non-hedge funds. Panel A of 
Table 6 presents the estimation results. In line with our expectations, we find that a higher 
number of involved hedge funds is positively related to the increase in pre-announcement short 
interest. Moreover, the involvement of hedge funds increases the negative relation between 
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changes in pre-announcement short interest and the abnormal return in reaction to the 
announcement. Both these effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, irrespective 
of the window that we use. In addition, we do not find significant effects of the number of non-
hedge funds, which again suggests that the profitable pre-announcement changes in short interest 
are explained by hedge funds.  
To provide an alternative test of the impact of hedge funds, in Panel B of Table 6 we 
consider a sample of private placements in which hedge funds have no involvement (135 
observations), and in Panel C we consider a sample of private placements in which hedge funds 
are the sole participants (94 observations). To examine the effects of the overall number of 
buyers for these relatively small sample sizes, we include a dummy variable (DB,>1) that takes a 
value of one if the number of buyers in the private placement is greater than one and is zero 
otherwise.  
It can be seen that the sample with no hedge fund involvement (Panel B) suffers from a 
general lack of significance of the estimated parameters. On the other hand, for the 94 private 
placements in which hedge funds are the sole buyers (Panel C), we find evidence of a larger 
increase in short interest in the pre-announcement period if there is more than 1 hedge fund 
buyer. For issues solely purchased by hedge funds, the coefficient estimate for the interactive 
term is consistently negative across both reported results and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, again indicating that the relation between short selling and announcement returns 
is more negative when more than one hedge fund buyer is involved in the private placement.  
To summarize, we find that when no hedge funds are involved as buyers in private 
placements, there is no evidence of a relation between pre-announcement short selling and 
announcement period returns. Similarly, when there is only one hedge fund buyer, the predictive 
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ability of pre-announcement changes in short interest is lost. When there are a number of hedge 
funds involved, however, the change in short interest in advance of private placement 
announcements is informative.  
 
[ insert Table 6 here ] 
  
VI. Additional Tests 
In this section, we first examine whether inclusion of variables that proxy for information 
asymmetry and the probability of a private placement impact our results. Next, we discuss the 
results of a simulation analysis that shows that the relation between the change in short interest 
and the subsequent return is exceptionally strong for the event that we study compared to non-
events. We then explain the pre-announcement change in short interest using only information 
that is available to wall-crossed investors before the announcement of the private placement, 
instead of using actual announcement returns. Finally, we discuss the results of some additional 
extensions to our base models. In all these additional tests we consistently find that our results 
are robust. 
 
A. Information asymmetry and the probability of a private placement 
Companies with high information asymmetry tend to place more securities with hedge 
funds (see for example Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm, 2009). As a result, our findings on the impact 
of hedge funds could be due to spurious correlation where information asymmetry is the factor 
driving changes in pre-announcement short selling. To control for this possibility, we include the 
Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) psi variable as a proxy for the level of information 
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asymmetry. This variable psi measures the firm-specific return variability in a given year relative 
to the total return variability. The underlying intuition is that firms with a higher level of firm-
specific variation in stock returns have more informative stock prices and therefore have a lower 
level of information asymmetry.
29
  
Our second additional control variable represents the probability of a private placement 
based on publicly observable firm characteristics. Inclusion of this variable could be important if 
the probability of a private placement affects the change in short interest in the pre-
announcement period, for example because firms with a high probability of a private placement 
have a higher level of short interest at the start of the pre-announcement event window. To 
obtain this variable, we download the full sample of firms from Compustat for the period 2006 – 
2010. We estimate a logit regression model in which the dependent variable equals one if the 
firm privately places an equity or convertible issue in the subsequent year, and zero otherwise.
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The explanatory variables included in the regression equation are based on Chen, Dai and 
Schatzberg (2010) and Ellis and Twite (2013), and all firm characteristics are measured at the 
fiscal year-end. Firms are only included if all the required data in Compustat, CRSP, and IBES 
are available. Appendix C presents the estimation results for this model. Consistent with earlier 
studies, we find that companies that privately place securities are relatively small, volatile and 
have low profitability. These firms also tend to have low turnover and relatively high leverage 
and capital expenditure. In calculating probabilities of a private issue for a particular firm in a 
particular year, we use the estimated coefficients in Appendix C, including industry and year 
                                                          
29
 This variable is also used in, for example, Dittmar and Thakor (2007). The firm-specific stock return variation is 
obtained from the regression: Firm return(t) = β0 + β1 market return(t) + β2 industry return(t) + ε, which is estimated 
for each firm, using monthly returns measured over the year prior to the security offering. Psi is the variance of 
ε scaled by the total variance of the dependent variable. A high estimate of psi indicates low information 
asymmetry. 
30
 That is, the dependent variable is collected for the period 2007 – 2011. 
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dummies. We calculate the estimated probability of a private issue for each of the observations in 
our sample and include this estimated probability as an additional control variable in our 
regression models. 
Because the possibility of information leakage might be related to the size of the firm, we 
also include the natural logarithm of market capitalization, measured at day -20. In addition, to 
control for potential differences in normal trading volumes and the costs of trading, we include 
normal turnover and the percentage bid-ask spread as our fourth and fifth additional control 
variable. Normal turnover is calculated as the issuer’s average turnover over days [-50, -21] and 
the percentage bid-ask spread is measured at the start of the window over which the change in 
short interest is measured (i.e. at day -10 or -20). We are able to obtain these additional variables 
for 602 of our observations.   
Panels A and B of Table 7 show a re-estimated equation (1) with the additional control 
variables. Our measures of information asymmetry, firm size and turnover are never significantly 
related to the change in short interest. Hence, it is unlikely that differences in information 
asymmetry are able to explain the results in Table 4. For convertible issues (Panel A), we find 
that the change in short interest is positively related to the probability of a private placement and 
negatively related to the bid-ask spread, whereas we do not find these relations for common 
stock issues (Panel B). Most importantly, in both panels we find that including the additional 
control variables does not change our conclusions with regard to the ability of short sellers to 
successfully anticipate abnormal announcement returns.  
In Panel C of Table 7 we present the results on the impact of hedge fund involvement 
when we include additional control variables. In line with our earlier results, we find that a 
higher number of hedge fund investors in the placement is positively related to the increase in 
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pre-announcement short interest and that the involvement of hedge funds increases the negative 
relation between changes in pre-announcement short interest and the abnormal return in reaction 
to the announcement.
31
  
 
[ insert Table 7 here ] 
 
B. Simulation analysis 
A possible concern with our analysis regarding equation (1) is that the estimates for the 
relation between the pre-announcement change in short interest and the announcement return 
might reflect the typical relation between the change in short interest over a 10-day or 20-day 
window and the subsequent 2-day abnormal return, rather than being specific to the 
announcement of private placements. To provide evidence on this issue, we estimate equation (1) 
for 100 pseudo-events which are centered on a new event day 0. For each observation, new event 
day 0 is equal to actual event day 0 plus T trading days. For this analysis, we let T start at a value 
of -110, increase in steps of 2, and end at a value of +110. We exclude all T’s in the interval -10 
to +10. 
For each of the pseudo-events, we estimate equation (1) and collect the t-statistic for the 
α1 coefficient. This gives an empirical distribution of 100 t-statistics. For our sample of private 
placements of common stock, the t-statistic for the true event day 0 is between the first and 
second percentile of the empirical distribution for the 10-day window, and smaller than the first 
percentile for the 20-day window. For the sample of convertibles, the t-statistic of α1 for the true 
event day 0 is between the first and second percentile of the empirical distribution for the 10-day 
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 When we re-estimate our other models, we again find that the inclusion of the additional variables does not 
materially change our conclusions. 
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window, and between the fourth and fifth percentile for the 20-day window. These results show 
that the strong relation between the pre-announcement change in short interest and the 
announcement return reported in Table 4 is exceptional and is unlikely to be the result of a 
typical relation between the change in short interest and subsequent abnormal returns. 
 
C. Offering discount and predicted announcement return 
Throughout the paper we have used actual announcement returns as a proxy for wall-
crossers’ expectations of announcement returns. Instead of actual announcement returns, this 
section uses information on the offering discount to explain the pre-announcement change in 
short interest. Note that information on the offering discount is available to wall-crossed 
investors before the announcement of the private placement. In addition to the offering discount, 
we use a predicted announcement return, which again is only based on information available to 
wall-crossed investors before the announcement. If short sellers are speculating on negative 
announcement effects, then we expect to observe a larger increase in pre-announcement short 
interest in case of a larger offering discount and in case of a more negative predicted price 
change on announcement.  
We are able to obtain the offering discount for 301 common stock PIPEs with data from 
Sagient. The offering discount is calculated as the percentage difference between the stock price 
on day -1 and the price per share offered to the security buyers. For example, a value of -0.1 
indicates that the offering price is 10 percent below the pre-announcement stock price. The 
average offering discount in our sample is -4.45 percent, with a standard deviation of 18.59 
percent.  
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Our second measure of the expected announcement return is the predicted announcement 
return based only on variables that are observable to wall-crossed investors before the 
announcement. The explanatory variables included in the regression equation to obtain the 
predicted announcement return are based on Dai (2007), Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2009), and 
Floros and Sapp (2012). Firms are only included if all the required data in Compustat, CRSP, 
and Sagient are available. Appendix D presents the estimation results for this model. Consistent 
with earlier studies, we find that announcement returns are significantly higher for larger issues, 
and for issues that have a smaller discount (i.e. a less negative discount). Announcement returns 
are significantly lower for larger firms and for issues that have more hedge fund participation. In 
calculating the predicted announcement return, we use the estimated coefficients in Appendix D. 
The average predicted announcement return based on the model in Appendix D is 1.8 percent, 
with a standard deviation of 4.8 percent. The correlation between the actual announcement return 
and the predicted announcement return is 0.46 (significant at the 0.1 percent level). The 
correlation between the actual announcement return and the offering discount is 0.33 (significant 
at the 0.1 percent level). 
Table 8 shows the relation between these two measures of expected announcement 
returns and the pre-announcement change in short interest. In line with our expectations, both the 
offering discount and the predicted announcement return are negatively related to the change in 
pre-announcement short interest. The relation between the change in short interest and the 
predicted announcement return is the strongest, with statistical significance at the 1 percent level 
for both event windows.
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 We further examine whether our results related to hypothesis 3 and 4 are robust to the inclusion of the offering 
discount. We find that both the positive relation between the number of buyers and changes in pre-announcement 
short selling (Table 5) and the relation between the number of hedge funds and pre-announcement short selling 
(Panel A of Table 6) are robust to including the offering discount to the corresponding regression specifications.  
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D. Alternative measures, windows and samples 
For our first set of robustness tests, we: i) estimate all models without winsorizing; ii)  
estimate all models after transforming the independent variables into decile ranks, scaled to 
range from −0.5 to 0.5; iii) examine the impact of removing the 15 security issues that occur 
during or within 20 days after the 2008 short sale ban; and iv) examine the impact of choosing 
particular event windows by re-examining our results when abnormal announcement returns are 
measured on day 0, and when abnormal announcement returns are measured over a 5-day 
window, starting on day 0. We find that our results are robust in all of these instances.
33
  
In a second set of additional tests, we add a dummy variable (DUM) and an interaction 
variable (CAR(0,+1) * DUM) to our models. In a first additional test, we examine whether our 
results are specific to sub-periods in our sample. In this test, the dummy variable assumes a value 
of 1 if the private placement takes place in 2007 or 2008, and zero otherwise. In a second 
additional test, the dummy variable assumes a value of 1 if the private placement was preceded 
by another private placement for the same stock in the period going back to 2000, which 
represents the start of the Sagient database, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable controls for 
an effect of repetitive issuers, which Floros and Sapp (2012) have found to be important in 
explaining announcement returns. In a final additional test, we control for events where short 
selling might have been relatively difficult because the stock was ‘on special’. In this test, the 
dummy variable assumes a value of 1 if the lending fee in the 10-day period before the 
                                                          
33
 All the unreported results in the paper are available upon request. 
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announcement was larger than 250 basis points, and zero otherwise. Again, our results affirm the 
robustness of the main conclusions, as the estimation results are qualitatively similar to those 
detailed in the main body of the paper.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper examines privately placed common stock and convertible offerings in the U.S. 
markets in the period 2007 – 2011. Using proprietary short interest data, we document significant 
increases in short interest in the pre-announcement period and show that pre-announcement short 
sellers are able to predict announcement day returns. We find that pre-announcement short 
selling is particularly informative when the number of buyers is high and when there is a high 
degree of hedge fund participation.  
Our results reinforce the concerns expressed by regulators around the world that wall-
crossing – the practice where companies that are planning a private placement gauge the interest 
of potential buyers before the offering is publicly announced – might result in insider trading. 
Our results indicate that the limited resources of regulators should be directed towards examining 
those placements with a high degree of hedge fund involvement and a large number of wall-
crossed investors.  
Our findings are also relevant to the issues of hedge fund regulation and disclosure of 
short positions. Both these issues came to the fore with the implementation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, which was aimed at closing regulatory gaps and ending the speculative trading practices that 
contributed to the 2008 financial market crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act mandates hedge fund 
advisers to increase record keeping and disclosure, and also called for studies of costs and 
benefits of reporting, in real time, short sale positions. Our results suggest that more extensive 
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and timely disclosures of short interest is of great interest to the parties involved in private 
placements and would help market participants in reporting suspicious short selling activity to 
enforcement authorities. 
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Figure 1 
Changes in Short Interest Around the Announcement of a Private Placement 
This figure plots the pattern in mean short interest (as a percentage of shares outstanding) over the window -50 to 
+40 days around the announcements of convertible bond private placements (Panel A) and common stock private 
placements (Panel B). 
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Figure 2 
Changes in Short Interest Around the Announcement of a Private Placement of Convertible Bonds Distinguishing Between the 
Number of Buyers 
This figure presents a plot of the average short interest (as a percentage of shares outstanding) in the period of -50 to +40 days around the announcement of a 
private placement of convertible bonds, where the sample is split into three groups based on the number of buyers: the first group consists of private placements 
with one buyer; the second group consists of private placements with 2 to 10 buyers; and the third group consists of private placements with more than 10 buyers.  
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Figure 3 
Changes in Short Interest Around the Announcement of a Private Placement of Common Stock Distinguishing Between the 
Number of Buyers 
This figure presents a plot of the average short interest (as a percentage of shares outstanding) in the period of -50 to +40 days around the announcement of a 
private placement of common stock, where the sample is split into three groups based on the number of buyers: the first group consists of private placements with 
one buyer; the second group consists of private placements with 2 to 10 buyers; and the third group consists of private placements with more than 10 buyers. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study, where the description of the variables 
is presented in Appendix B. We obtain a sample of 662 common stock and convertible bond private placements 
from Securities Data Company (SDC) and Sagient’s PlacementTracker. The sample period is from January 2007 to 
August 2011, the period for which we have daily short interest data from Dataexplorers. The total sample of 662 
private placements comprises 323 convertible bond issues (152 are 144A offerings and 171 are PIPE offerings) and 
339 common stock issues by 536 unique firms. Panel B presents the average values for the variables when we 
distinguish between the type of issue. The final three rows contain additional information specific to the 144A and 
PIPE convertible issues. 
 
Panel A: All Private Placements 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard Deviation 
Market Capitalization 1,811 
 
199 
 
11,057 
Total Assets 8,279 
 
219 
 
67,661 
Proceeds 166 
 
25 
 
621 
Relative Proceeds 0.22 
 
0.14 
 
0.42 
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.71 
 
1.68 
 
3.05 
Return Volatility 0.73 
 
0.64 
 
0.39 
Book Leverage 0.23 
 
0.17 
 
0.24 
Dividend Paying 0.19 
 
0.00 
 
0.39 
ROA -0.18 
 
-0.01 
 
0.35 
Short Interest 6.20 
 
3.61 
 
7.39 
Beneficial Ownership 13.25 
 
8.90 
 
12.49 
Lending Fee 379 
 
29 
 
979 
Number of Buyers
*
 14 
 
5 
 
30 
Hedge Fund Involved
*
 0.51 
 
1 
 
0.41 
Number of Hedge Funds
*
 7 
 
2 
 
10 
Note: 
*
 - These summary metrics are for a restricted sample of the data as information on the number of buyers is 
not available for all observations. 
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Panel B: Average Values When Distinguishing Between Placement Type 
 
Convertible Bond Common Stock 
 
144A PIPEs PIPEs 
Market Capitalization 4,947 1,673 475 
Total Assets 8,720 21,289 1,519 
Proceeds 319 281 40 
Relative Proceeds 0.18 0.31 0.20 
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.24 2.16 3.20 
Return Volatility 0.52 0.74 0.81 
Book Leverage 0.25 0.26 0.21 
Dividend Paying 0.22 0.32 0.12 
ROA 0.03 -0.12 -0.30 
Short Interest 9.17 6.01 4.95 
Beneficial Ownership 26.37 10.84 8.58 
Lending Fee 100 385 539 
Number of Buyers
*
 38 14 9 
Hedge Fund Involved
*
 0.73 0.38 0.53 
Number of Hedge Funds
*
 21 4 5 
Conversion Premium 28 26 - 
Delta  0.76 0.77 - 
Years-to-Maturity 10 5 - 
Note: 
*
 - These summary metrics are for a restricted sample of the data as information on the number of 
buyers is not available for all observations. 
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Table 2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Private Placement Announcements  
This table presents the sum of abnormal returns on the announcement day (day 0) and the next trading day (day 1) 
for the full sample of private placements as well as for each class of asset issued. The sample consists of 152 
convertible bond 144A offerings, 171 convertible bond PIPE offerings, and 339 common stock PIPE issues. The 
abnormal daily return is the difference between the actual return and the return on the same day of a value-weighted 
portfolio of all firms in the same size and book-to-market quintiles. 
 
 
Mean t-statistic 
 
Median Standard Deviation 
Full Sample 1.06 2.2 
 
-0.06 
 
12.64 
Convertibles – Rule 144A -3.51 -5.4 
 
-2.59 
 
8.08 
Convertibles – PIPE 2.48 2.0 
 
0.75 
 
16.10 
Common Stock – PIPE 2.40 3.7 
 
1.61 
 
11.84 
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Table 3 
Average Abnormal Activity Around Private Placement Announcements  
This table presents average abnormal short interest, beneficial ownership, lending fee and turnover in the days around the announcement of private placements of 
convertible bonds and private placements of common stock. For each event and for each variable, we first calculate the average value over the 30-day period 
from day -50 to -21. Next, for each event day, we subtract this average from the actual value and average these daily abnormal values across all observations in 
each group. For each group, the t-statistics are based on the standard deviation across these daily abnormal values. We report t-statistics in parentheses. Detailed 
definitions of the variables are in Appendix B.  
 
             Convertible Issues Common Stock Issues 
Event  
Day 
Abnormal  
Short  
Interest 
Abnormal  
Beneficial  
Ownership 
Abnormal  
Lending  
Fee 
Abnormal  
Turnover 
 Abnormal  
Short  
Interest 
Abnormal  
Beneficial  
Ownership 
Abnormal  
Lending  
Fee 
Abnormal  
Turnover 
-20 0.109 (1.4) 0.290 (3.8) -4.975 (-0.4) 1.158 (1.1)  0.134 (2.2) 0.066 (0.7) 10.105 (0.4) 0.223 (0.2) 
-19 0.206 (2.2) 0.353 (4.2) 16.057 (0.9) 0.037 (0.1)  0.144 (2.1) 0.078 (0.7) -20.708 (-0.7) 4.043 (0.9) 
-18 0.202 (2.1) 0.256 (2.6) 41.335 (1.6) 0.719 (0.6)  0.176 (2.3) 0.177 (1.4) 33.053 (1.3) 5.090 (0.9) 
-17 0.174 (1.8) 0.265 (2.5) 53.350 (2.0) 3.821 (1.0)  0.171 (2.1) 0.250 (2.2) 62.184 (3.1) 1.305 (0.7) 
-16 0.208 (2.1) 0.284 (3.0) 20.376 (1.2) 2.157 (1.3)  0.218 (2.5) 0.108 (0.9) 15.226 (0.6) 0.638 (0.3) 
-15 0.221 (2.0) 0.237 (2.4) 29.494 (1.4) 5.314 (1.4)  0.237 (2.6) 0.146 (1.2) 16.631 (0.9) 0.347 (0.2) 
-14 0.211 (2.0) 0.298 (3.4) 15.709 (0.8) 1.219 (0.7)  0.282 (3.0) 0.027 (0.2) 31.400 (1.2) 0.966 (0.5) 
-13 0.253 (2.3) 0.222 (2.1) 17.024 (0.8) 0.844 (0.6)  0.277 (2.8) 0.140 (1.1) 77.018 (2.6) -0.248 (-0.3) 
-12 0.243 (2.2) 0.235 (2.3) -16.44 (-0.8) 1.824 (1.2)  0.326 (3.0) 0.164 (1.3) 15.697 (0.5) 1.064 (0.7) 
-11 0.244 (2.0) 0.254 (2.4) 6.772 (0.4) 2.971 (1.2)  0.359 (3.1) 0.070 (0.6) 32.835 (1.3) 2.161 (0.8) 
-10 0.230 (1.8) 0.270 (2.5) 31.593 (1.5) 0.895 (0.9)  0.377 (3.2) 0.148 (1.2) 2.157 (0.1) -0.989 (-1.5) 
-9 0.312 (2.2) 0.268 (2.3) -2.739 (-0.1) 1.615 (1.5)  0.368 (3.1) 0.033 (0.2) 14.073 (0.5) 0.556 (0.5) 
-8 0.323 (2.3) 0.138 (1.0) 46.420 (2.3) 1.635 (1.5)  0.435 (3.6) 0.113 (0.8) 27.937 (1.4) -0.370 (-0.4) 
-7 0.334 (2.3) -0.017 (-0.1) 28.236 (1.5) 2.155 (1.7)  0.453 (3.7) 0.133 (1.0) 44.192 (1.8) -0.196 (-0.2) 
-6 0.399 (2.5) 0.073 (0.5) 69.149 (1.9) -0.094 (-0.1)  0.501 (3.8) 0.020 (0.1) 41.005 (1.5) 2.045 (1.2) 
-5 0.421 (2.8) 0.078 (0.5) 45.192 (2.7) 1.745 (1.1)  0.506 (3.8) 0.037 (0.3) 33.991 (1.1) 2.367 (0.6) 
-4 0.426 (2.8) 0.094 (0.7) 31.655 (1.5) 1.095 (0.8)  0.600 (4.2) 0.064 (0.5) 51.785 (1.8) -0.039 (0.0) 
-3 0.747 (4.5) 0.011 (0.1) 35.748 (2.0) 1.451 (1.0)  0.608 (4.1) 0.136 (0.9) 35.790 (1.4) -0.323 (-0.3) 
-2 0.855 (4.6) 0.084 (0.6) 53.931 (3.1) 5.612 (1.6)  0.586 (3.9) 0.058 (0.4) 28.640 (1.3) 0.720 (0.5) 
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-1 0.912 (5.0) -0.01 (-0.1) 56.962 (2.4) 2.843 (3.0)  0.573 (3.9) -0.017 (-0.1) 33.066 (1.2) 2.020 (0.8) 
0 1.263 (6.5) 0.109 (0.7) 42.181 (2.8) 31.262 (10.6)  0.515 (3.4) 0.019 (0.1) 68.324 (2.4) 19.854 (4.9) 
1 1.858 (8.6) 0.194 (1.3) 86.372 (4.7) 35.392 (10.8)  0.521 (3.4) 0.043 (0.3) 58.069 (2.0) 6.665 (2.7) 
2 1.974 (8.9) 0.144 (0.9) 70.046 (3.6) 8.147 (6.8)  0.407 (2.7) -0.098 (-0.7) 46.682 (1.5) 2.613 (1.7) 
3 2.014 (8.9) 0.162 (1.0) 66.075 (3.2) 5.798 (5.3)  0.312 (2.0) -0.143 (-0.9) 45.321 (1.8) 3.242 (1.0) 
4 2.041 (8.7) 0.090 (0.5) 54.993 (3.0) 3.218 (3.1)  0.302 (1.9) -0.210 (-1.3) 39.215 (1.4) 2.946 (1.4) 
5 2.063 (8.6) 0.060 (0.4) 30.745 (1.5) 2.603 (2.2)  0.220 (1.4) -0.123 (-0.8) 40.386 (1.2) 3.864 (1.0) 
6 2.022 (8.5) 0.180 (1.2) 48.942 (2.7) 2.795 (2.6)  0.214 (1.4) -0.270 (-1.7) 36.731 (1.5) 3.450 (1.1) 
7 1.998 (8.2) 0.220 (1.4) 50.817 (2.7) 1.197 (1.2)  0.197 (1.3) -0.204 (-1.3) 21.969 (0.9) 3.859 (1.3) 
8 2.012 (8.2) 0.209 (1.3) 28.640 (1.6) 1.617 (1.4)  0.171 (1.1) -0.262 (-1.6) 40.044 (1.1) 1.629 (0.8) 
9 2.000 (8.2) 0.210 (1.4) 46.371 (3.2) 1.274 (1.1)  0.185 (1.2) -0.276 (-1.7) 53.170 (2.0) 0.676 (0.6) 
10 2.017 (8.0) 0.208 (1.3) 41.601 (2.4) 1.807 (1.2)  0.150 (0.9) -0.218 (-1.4) 27.146 (0.7) 2.564 (0.8) 
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Table 4 
Does the Change in Short Interest Predict Announcement Returns? 
The following table presents the estimation results for equation (1), i.e.:  
ΔSI(-T,-1)i =  + 1 CAR(0,+1)i +  CAR(-T,-1)i +  ATurn(-T,-1)i +  Fee(-T,-1)i +  Rel_Proceedsi + εi, 
where the dependent variable, ΔSI(-T,-1)i, is the change in short interest in stock i over day –T to day -1 , where 
T = 10 or 20. The independent variables are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), the average daily abnormal 
turnover (ATurn), the average daily stock lending fee (Fee), and the relative proceeds of the issue 
(Rel_Proceeds). For convertible issues, the model includes an additional dummy variable that indicates whether 
the convertible issue is a Rule 144A offering (D144A) and an interactive term that captures the cross effects 
between a Rule 144A offering and the announcement return (D144A*CAR(0,+1)). Panel A presents the 
estimation results for convertible debt private placements and Panel B presents the estimation results for 
common stock private placements. All continuous firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 
percent levels and reported p-values are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and quarter.  
 
Panel A: Convertible Debt (323 observations) 
 
T = 10  T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value  Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 0.093 0.66  0.077 0.75 
CAR(0,+1)i -3.271 0.02  -3.058 0.05 
CAR(-T,-1)i -2.372 0.77 
 
-4.097 0.86 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.026 0.01 
 
0.052 0.00 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.023 0.06  -0.039 0.05 
Rel_Proceeds i 0.535 0.12  0.563 0.17 
D144A 0.312 0.35  -0.073 0.84 
D144A*CAR(0,+1)i 0.229 0.92  0.203 0.93 
 
  
 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.11  0.12 
 
Panel B: Common Stock (339 observations) 
 
T = 10  T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value  Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 0.194 0.03  0.421 0.02 
CAR(0,+1)i -1.338 0.02 
 
-3.208 0.00 
CAR(-T,-1)i 2.005 0.77 
 
15.535 0.09 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.009 0.22 
 
0.016 0.18 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.016 0.00  -0.034 0.01 
Rel_Proceeds i 0.182 0.02  0.418 0.02 
 
  
 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.01  0.04 
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Table 5 
Estimating the Impact of the Number of Buyers  
The following table presents the estimation results for equation (2), i.e.:  
ΔSI(-T,-1)i =  + DB,2-10 +  DB,>10 +  CAR(0,+1)i +  DB,2-10*CAR(0,+1)i +  DB,>10*CAR(0,+1)i + 
 CAR(-T,-1)i +  ATurni(-T,-1)i +  Fee(-T,-1)i +  Rel_Proceedsi + εi 
where the dependent variable, ΔSI(-T,-1)i, is the change in short interest in stock i over day –T to day -1, where 
T = 10 or 20. The independent variable DB,2-10 (DB,>10) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
number of buyers in the private placement is between 2 and 10 (greater than 10) and is zero otherwise. The other 
independent variables are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), the average daily abnormal turnover (ATurn), 
the average daily stock lending fee (Fee), and the relative proceeds of the issue (Rel_Proceeds). All continuous 
firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels and reported p-values are based on 
standard errors that are clustered by firm and quarter. There are 451 private placements for which we have 
information on the total number of buyers.   
 
 
T = 10 T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept -0.150 0.18 -0.197 0.19 
DB,2-10 0.315 0.14 0.405 0.10 
DB,>10 0.974 0.00 1.237 0.00 
CAR(0,+1)i -0.514 0.55 -0.957 0.41 
CAR(0,+1) i * DB,2-10 -1.064 0.59 -2.445 0.29 
CAR(0,+1) i * DB,>10 -3.978 0.01 -4.052 0.09 
CAR(-T,-1)i  2.590 0.65 10.502 0.45 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.016 0.01 0.034 0.01 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.023 0.01 -0.040 0.01 
Rel_Proceeds i -0.076 0.64 0.080 0.80 
     Adjusted R
2
 0.11 0.12 
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Table 6 
Estimating the Impact of Hedge Fund Involvement in Private Placements 
The following table presents the estimation results for equations in which the dependent variable is ΔSI(-T,-1)i, 
i.e. the change in short interest in stock i over day –T to day -1, where T = 10 or 20. The independent variables 
are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), the average daily abnormal turnover (ATurn), the average daily 
stock lending fee (Fee), and the relative proceeds of the issue (Rel_Proceeds). Panel A also includes variables 
for the number of hedge funds involved, the number of non-hedge funds involved, and the interaction terms 
between these variables and CAR. Panel B and C include a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
number of buyers in the private placement is greater than one and is zero otherwise (DB,>1). Panel B presents the 
estimation results for the sample in which there is no hedge fund involvement (n=142, of which 96 placements 
had one buyer, i.e. DB,>1 = 0, and 46 placements had more than 1 buyer, i.e. DB,>1 = 1). Panel C presents the 
estimation results for the sample in which hedge funds are the sole participants (n=95, of which 61 placements 
had one buyer, i.e. DB,>1 = 0, and 34 placements had more than 1 buyer, i.e. DB,>1 = 1). All continuous firm-level 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels and reported p-values are based on standard 
errors that are clustered by firm and quarter. There are 451 private placements for which we have information on 
the total number of buyers.   
 
Panel A: Number of (Non) Hedge Funds 
 
T = 10 T = 20 
 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 0.070 0.51 0.170 0.31 
Number Non-Hedge Funds 0.010 0.13 0.013 0.16 
Number Hedge Funds 0.032 0.01 0.026 0.03 
CAR(0,+1)i -0.887 0.16 -2.083 0.02 
CAR(0,+1) i * Number Non-Hedge Funds 0.028 0.57 0.050 0.51 
CAR(0,+1) i * Number Hedge Funds -0.259 0.02 -0.253 0.05 
CAR(-T,-1) i 2.192 0.69 9.591 0.51 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.011 0.04 0.028 0.02 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.021 0.01 -0.039 0.00 
Rel_Proceeds i -0.107 0.45 0.133 0.67 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.13 0.11 
 
Panel B: Issues with No Hedge Fund Involvement 
 
T = 10 T = 20 
 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept -0.020 0.89 -0.064 0.77 
DB,>1 0.154 0.54 -0.151 0.63 
CAR(0,+1)i -0.247 0.74 -1.206 0.44 
CAR(0,+1) i * DB,>1 -1.080 0.55 -0.769 0.68 
CAR(-T,-1) i 17.239 0.01 24.741 0.25 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.016 0.10 0.032 0.20 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.009 0.52 -0.022 0.27 
Rel_Proceeds i -1.159 0.16 -0.501 0.49 
     
     Adjusted R
2
 0.07 0.06 
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Panel C: Issues Solely Purchased by Hedge Funds 
 
T =10 T =20 
 
Parameter 
Estimate p-value 
Parameter 
Estimate p-value 
Intercept -0.009 0.95 -0.086 0.66 
DB,>1 0.220 0.53 0.717 0.04 
CAR(0,+1)i 2.228 0.32 3.648 0.37 
CAR(0,+1) i * DB,>1 -8.168 0.03 -13.831 0.04 
CAR(-T,-1) i 4.931 0.58 18.063 0.44 
ATurn(-T,-1)i -0.001 0.91 0.013 0.37 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.007 0.55 -0.011 0.51 
Rel_Proceeds i -0.705 0.37 -1.537 0.25 
     Adjusted R
2
 0.03 0.18 
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Table 7 
Additional Control Variables 
The following table presents the estimation results when we include additional control variables. The first two 
additional variables are Psi, which is the Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) measure for information 
asymmetry, and Probability of Private Placement, which follows from the logit model in Appendix C. The other 
additional variables are the natural logarithm of market capitalization, the issuer’s normal turnover over days [-
50, -21], and the bid-ask spread at day –T. The dependent variable is ΔSI(-T,-1)i, i.e. the change in short interest 
in stock i over day –T to day -1, where T = 10 or 20. The other variables are as in Table 4 (for Panel A and B) 
and Table 6 (for Panel C) and the description of these variables is presented in Appendix B. Panel A presents the 
estimation results for convertible debt private placements, Panel B presents the estimation results for common 
stock private placements, and Panel C includes both convertible debt and common stock private placements. All 
continuous firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels and reported p-values are 
based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and quarter.  
 
Panel A: Convertible Debt (308 observations) 
 
T = 10 T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 1.699 0.13 1.832 0.18 
CAR(0,+1)i -2.427 0.05 -2.311 0.11 
CAR(-T,-1)i -1.734 0.83 -6.978 0.76 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.024 0.06 0.069 0.01 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.030 0.06 -0.052 0.03 
Rel_Proceeds i 0.168 0.64 0.217 0.58 
Psi -0.046 0.93 0.215 0.77 
Probability Private Placement 4.937 0.07 5.507 0.08 
Log Market Capitalization -0.135 0.15 -0.155 0.19 
Normalized Turnover 0.011 0.54 -0.020 0.36 
% Bid Ask Spread -15.518 0.04 -15.753 0.04 
D144A 0.481 0.24 0.236 0.61 
D144A*CAR(0,+1)i 0.029 0.99 0.747 0.75 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.11 0.11 
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Panel B: Common Stock (294 observations) 
 
T = 10 T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept -0.805 0.57 -1.849 0.37 
CAR(0,+1)i -1.451 0.04 -3.383 0.01 
CAR(-T,-1)i 2.557 0.78 13.914 0.27 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.010 0.39 0.027 0.07 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.018 0.01 -0.035 0.02 
Rel_Proceeds i 0.246 0.00 0.506 0.02 
Psi -0.192 0.73 -0.339 0.64 
Probability Private Placement 1.153 0.28 0.176 0.89 
Log Market Capitalization 0.096 0.31 0.225 0.16 
Normalized Turnover -0.004 0.74 -0.021 0.15 
% Bid Ask Spread -4.627 0.48 -7.104 0.39 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.01 0.06 
 
Panel C: Number of (Non) Hedge Funds (406 observations) 
 
T = 10 T = 20 
 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 0.315 0.64 0.387 0.72 
Number Non-Hedge Funds 0.010 0.13 0.014 0.15 
Number Hedge Funds 0.029 0.03 0.023 0.13 
CAR(0,+1)i -0.970 0.23 -2.036 0.07 
CAR(0,+1) i * Number Non-Hedge Funds 0.032 0.50 0.062 0.42 
CAR(0,+1) i * Number Hedge Funds -0.244 0.04 -0.262 0.08 
CAR(-T,-1) i 2.414 0.66 5.926 0.74 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.010 0.12 0.042 0.03 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.024 0.01 -0.038 0.01 
Rel_Proceeds i -0.069 0.58 0.150 0.60 
Psi -0.307 0.38 -0.431 0.53 
Probability Private Placement 1.442 0.16 0.083 0.96 
Log Market Capitalization 0.003 0.94 0.027 0.64 
Normalized Turnover -0.002 0.84 -0.026 0.06 
% Bid Ask Spread -11.764 0.09 -13.182 0.12 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.10 0.10 
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Table 8 
Offering Discount, Expected Announcement Return, and Changes in Short Interest 
The following table presents the estimation results of a variant of equation (1), in which CAR(0,+1)i is replaced 
by either the offering discount of the issue (Panel A) or the expected announcement return for the issue (Panel 
B). The dependent variable is ΔSI(-T,-1)i, which is the change in short interest in stock i over day –T to day -1, 
where T = 10 or 20. The offering discount of the issue is the percentage difference between the stock price 
before the announcement of the offering and the price per share offered to the security buyers. For example, a 
value of -0.1 indicates that the offering price is 10 percent below the pre-announcement stock price (i.e. the 
closing price on day -1). The expected announcement return is based on the regression model in Appendix D. 
The offering discount is available for 301 observations, all of which are common stock PIPEs, and the expected 
announcement return can be calculated for 222 of these observations. The other independent variables are the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), the average daily abnormal turnover (ATurn), the average daily stock 
lending fee (Fee), and the relative proceeds of the issue (Rel_Proceeds). All continuous firm-level variables are 
winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels and reported p-values are based on standard errors that are 
clustered by firm and quarter.  
 
Panel A: Offering Discount (301 observations) 
 
T = 10  T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value  Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 0.198 0.04  0.406 0.03 
Offering Discounti -0.550 0.15 
 
-1.455 0.03 
CAR(-T,-1)i 2.072 0.78 
 
12.613 0.21 
ATurn(-T,-1)i 0.008 0.30 
 
0.013 0.25 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.018 0.02  -0.042 0.01 
Rel_Proceeds i 0.149 0.13  0.365 0.04 
 
  
 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.00  0.03 
 
Panel B: Expected Announcement Return (222 observations) 
 
T = 10  T = 20 
 
Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value  Parameter  
Estimate 
p-value 
Intercept 0.441 0.00  0.746 0.01 
Expected Announcement Returni -4.975 0.01 
 
-9.044 0.01 
CAR(-T,-1)i 8.742 0.24 
 
21.578 0.14 
ATurn(-T,-1)i -0.003 0.62 
 
0.010 0.42 
Fee(-T,-1)i -0.028 0.01  -0.056 0.01 
Rel_Proceeds i 0.146 0.23  0.523 0.14 
 
  
 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.02  0.04 
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Appendix A: Summary of SEC Cases of Alleged Pre-Announcement (Short) Selling 
after Wall-Crossings 
SEC versus 
Complaint 
filed 
Security 
Number of 
securities 
Alleged 
violation 
Outcome 
Pollet April 2005 PIPE 10 (a) Shorting in 
2001 
Settled at $150,000 
Shane May 2005 PIPE 1 Shorting in 
2001 
Settled at $1,075,015 
Langley 
Partners 
March 2006 PIPE 7 Shorting during 
2000-2002 
Settled at 
$15,817,928 
Deephaven May 2006 PIPE 19 Shorting during 
2001-2004 
Settled at $5,819,958 
Mangan Dec. 2006 PIPE 1 Shorting in 
2001 
Not guilty (b) 
Gryphon 
Partners 
Dec. 2006 PIPE 4 Shorting during 
2001-2004 
Settled at $778,016 
Berlacher Sept. 2007 PIPE 1 Shorting in 
2004 
Not guilty (c) 
Cuban Nov. 2008 PIPE 1 Selling in 2004 At trial 
Mannion Oct. 2010 PIPE 1 Shorting in 
2004 
At trial 
(a) In four issues Pollet represented the PIPE issuer’s investment bank 
(b) The judge ruled that the announcement effect of the PIPE was too small for information to be deemed 
“material” 
(c) The judge ruled that the announcement effect of the PIPE was too small for information to be deemed 
“material”. Berlacher was found guilty of misrepresenting his short position to the issuer and sentenced to 
paying $352,364.  
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Appendix  B: Variable Definitions 
Variables are calculated at the end of the fiscal year-end preceding the announcement date, 
unless indicated otherwise. 
Variable Definition 
Market 
Capitalization 
Market value of equity (closing price multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding) 20 days before the announcement of the private placement. 
Total Assets  
The value of total assets (Compustat Item #AT) at the end of the fiscal 
year-end preceding the announcement date (in millions of dollars). 
Proceeds 
The gross proceeds of the issue in millions of dollars, as reported in the 
SDC database or in Sagient. 
Relative Proceeds 
 
Proceeds divided by Market Capitalization (abbreviated to Rel_Proceeds 
in the estimation equations). 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
Market value of common stock over the book value (Compustat Items 
(#AT - #CEQ + #PRCC_F * #CSHO) / #AT), measured at the end of the 
fiscal year-end preceding the announcement date. 
Return Volatility 
The annualized volatility of monthly stock returns based on the 12 
months before the announcement month. 
Book Leverage 
Total Debt calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by total assets (Compustat Items (#DLC + #DLTT) / 
#AT), measured at the end of the fiscal year-end preceding the 
announcement date. 
Dividend Paying 
A dummy variable equal to one if Compustat Item #DVC exceeds zero 
at the fiscal-year end preceding the issue date, and zero otherwise. 
 
ROA 
Earnings before interest and taxes over the fiscal year-end preceding the 
announcement date (Compustat Item #EBIT) over total assets at the end 
of the fiscal year-end preceding the announcement date (Compustat Item 
# AT). 
Short Interest 
The total number of shares lent according to the Dataexplorers database 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
Beneficial 
Ownership 
The total number of shares held by all beneficial owners according to 
the Dataexplorers database divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding.  
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Lending Fee 
Value weighted average fee for all new trades 10 days before the 
announcement, in basis points per annum as reported in the 
Dataexplorers database.  
Number Buyers 
The total number of buyers in the private placements is either from the 
Sagient database, or, if missing, from the registration statements, which 
we download from SEC Edgar. 
Hedge Fund 
Involved 
Dummy variable equals 1 if there is at least one hedge fund among the 
buyers in the private placement, and zero if there is no hedge fund 
among the buyers in the private placement. 
Number Hedge 
Funds 
The total number of hedge funds among the buyers in the private 
placements is either from the Sagient database, or, if missing, from the 
registration statements, which we download from SEC Edgar. 
Conversion 
Premium 
The conversion premium is obtained from either SDC or Sagient and is 
the excess of the conversion price over the stock price at the time of 
issue expressed as a percentage of the stock price.  
Delta 
 
 
 
 
Delta is the convertible’s dollar sensitivity to small changes in the value 
of the underlying. It is calculated as 
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where N(•) is the cumulative probability under a standard normal 
distribution; S is the price of the underlying stock measured at day 5 
relative to the issue date (from CRSP); X is the conversion price (from 
SDC or Sagient); r is the yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury bond (from 
Datastream), σ is the annualized stock return volatility, and T represents 
the stated maturity of the convertible as of its issuance date.  
Years-to-Maturity Years to maturity is the number of years until the convertible matures at 
the time of issuance, and is obtained from either SDC or Sagient. 
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Appendix C: Forecasting the Probability of a Private Placement 
This table presents the results of a logit regression model, estimating the probability of a private placement of 
convertible debt or common stock. The sample period is 2006–2010. The dependent variable equals one if the 
firm privately places a convertible or common stock issue in the subsequent year, and equals zero otherwise, and 
is thus collected for the period 2007–2011. Firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end. Firm size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars (Compustat Item #AT), Turnover is sales (#SALE) 
divided by assets, Slack is cash and short-term investments (#CHE) over total assets, R&D intensity are R&D 
expenses (#XRD) over sales, Profitability is #EBIT over total assets, Leverage is book leverage, calculated as 
(#DLC + #DLTT) / #AT, Patents is intangibles (#INTAN) minus goodwill (#GDWL), divided by total assets, 
Capital expenditures is #CAPX over total assets, Market-to-book ratio is (#AT - #CEQ + #PRCC_F * #CSHO) / 
#AT, Tangibility is #PPEGT / #AT, R&D growth is R&D (#XRD) over assets divided by R&D over assets in 
the prior year, minus one, Sales growth is sales divided by sales in the prior year, minus one, Return volatility is 
the annualized volatility of monthly stock returns, Stock price run-up is the average monthly stock return in a 
year, and Number of analysts is the number of analysts providing one-year earnings forecasts, obtained from 
IBES. We only include firms with all required data in Compustat, CRSP, and IBES. Our regression model 
includes industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on two-digit SIC codes. The number of 
observations is 7,482. 
 Parameter Estimate p-value 
Firm Size 0.136 0.00 
Turnover 0.343 0.04 
Slack 0.356 0.35 
R&D Intensity 0.042 0.16 
Profitability 0.917 0.00 
Leverage 0.890 0.00 
Patents 0.155 0.84 
Capital Expenditures 6.244 0.00 
Market-To-Book Ratio 0.036 0.28 
Tangibility 0.344 0.29 
R&D Growth 0.086 0.14 
Sales Growth 0.053 0.26 
Return Volatility 0.480 0.03 
Stock Price Run-up 0.119 0.93 
Number of Analysts 0.005 0.53 
   
Pseudo Adjusted R
2
 0.094 
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Appendix D: Predicting the Announcement Return 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression model that generates the predicted announcement returns, 
used in Table 8. The dependent variable is the announcement return, CAR(0,+1), for common stock PIPE 
issues. The independent variables are the offering discount (the percentage difference between the stock price on 
day -1 and the price per share offered to the security buyers) and several variables that have been used to explain 
the variation across announcement returns for common stock PIPE issues (see Dai, 2007; Brophy, Ouimet and 
Sialm, 2009; Floros and Sapp, 2012). Firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end in the year 
preceding the PIPE issue. Leverage is book leverage, calculated as Compustat Items (#DLC + #DLTT) / #AT; 
Tangibility is #PPEGT / #AT; Proceeds is the natural log of the gross proceeds of the issue, as reported in 
Sagient; Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization measured 20 days before the announcement; 
Market-to-book ratio is (#AT - #CEQ + #PRCC_F * #CSHO) / #AT; R&D intensity is R&D expenses (#XRD) 
over sales (#SALE); Sales proportion is sales (#SALE) divided by total assets (#AT); Dilution is defined as the 
number of shares issued in the private placement divided by the number of shares outstanding; Earlier PIPE 
offering is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer was involved in one or more PIPE issues between the 
date of the observation and the start of the Sagient database in 2000; Number of buyers is the number of buyers 
involved in the issue; and Number of hedge funds is the number of hedge funds among these buyers. There are 
222 observations with information on all variables.   
 
 Parameter Estimate p-value 
Offering discount 0.144 0.01 
Leverage 0.017 0.59 
Tangibility -0.001 0.98 
Proceeds 0.024 0.01 
Firm Size -0.242 0.03 
Market-To-Book Ratio 0.003 0.24 
R&D Intensity 0.002 0.21 
Sales Proportion 0.000 0.46 
Dilution -0.004 0.82 
Earlier PIPE Offering 0.003 0.83 
Number of Buyers 0.002 0.19 
Number of Hedge Funds -0.007 0.00 
   
Adjusted R
2
 0.143 
 
 
 
